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 The Flexible Substitution Logit:  




Different instruments are relevant for different marketing objectives (category demand 
expansion or market share stealing). To help brand managers make informed marketing mix 
decisions, it is essential that marketing mix models appropriately measure the different effects of 
marketing instruments. Discrete choice models that have been applied to this problem might not be 
adequate because they possess the Invariant Proportion of Substitution (IPS) property, which 
imposes counter-intuitive restrictions on individual choice behavior. Indeed our empirical 
application to prescription writing choices of physicians in the hyperlipidemia category shows this to 
be the case.  We find that three commonly used models that all suffer from the IPS restriction – the 
homogeneous logit model, the nested logit model, and the random coefficient logit model – lead to 
counter-intuitive estimates of the sources of demand gains due to increased marketing investments 
in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA), detailing, and Meetings and Events (M&E). We then 
propose an alternative choice model specification that relaxes the IPS property – the so-called 
“flexible substitution” logit (FSL) model. The (random coefficient) FSL model predicts that sales 
gains from DTCA and M&E come primarily from the non-drug treatment (87.4% and 70.2% 
respectively), whereas gains from detailing come at the expense of competing drugs (84%). By 
contrast, the random coefficient logit model predicts that gains from DTCA, M&E and detailing all 
would come largely from competing drugs. 1. Introduction 
An important decision made by brand managers is the choice of the marketing mix 
to help accomplish the sales and market share goals of the brand. Available marketing 
instruments differ by industry, but typically include prices, advertising, trade promotions, 
consumer promotions such as coupons and sweepstakes, in-store merchandising, and 
sales force efforts, as well as longer-term choices such as product-line depth and breadth. 
Since different instruments affect consumer behavior in different ways, the brand 
manager has the responsibility of mixing the marketing instruments optimally to achieve 
the brand’s goals. This may require, for instance, that in early stages of the product life 
cycle, a brand places emphasis on category expanding activities while in later, more 
mature stages of the life cycle, emphasis is placed on stealing share from competitors.  
Some marketing activities expand overall category demand by encouraging new 
purchases in the category, while others lead to stealing from competing brands. To 
illustrate using advertising as an instrument, the “Got Milk” campaign is clearly intended 
to grow primary demand for the category, milk. Similarly, a campaign that encourages use 
of a brand in a situation typically associated with a different category is intended to draw 
new category buyers to the brand (Wansink 1994). By contrast, comparative advertising 
that persuades the consumer about superiority of a brand’s features over a competing 
brand is aimed at encouraging within-category brand switching. Temporary reductions in 
the price of a brand on the retail shelf typically have a similar brand switching goal. Nijs, 
Dekimpe et al. (2001) reports that such price promotions rarely have persistent category 
expanding effects, while new product introductions do expand the category.    2
An important implication of the choice of marketing mix by a given brand is the 
impact on competing brands’ sales and market share -- some marketing actions are more 
threatening to competitors than others. At one extreme, marketing actions that primarily 
grow the category by attracting new buyers may even benefit competitors’ sales. On the 
other hand, actions that primarily induce buyers to switch from competing brands in the 
category clearly hurt competing brands’ sales and share. Accordingly, a brand manager 
may expect different degrees of competitive retaliation to different marketing 
instruments; an instrument that inflicts greater damage on a competing brand is more 
likely to elicit a reaction. Leeflang and Wittink (2001) find empirically that managers’ 
competitive reactions do take into account consumer response; the greater the cross-
brand demand elasticity, the greater the competitive reaction elasticity.  Steenkamp, Nijs 
et al. (2005) find that competitors’ response to price promotions is considerably stronger 
than competitors’ response to advertising. This is consistent with the conventional 
wisdom that sales gains from advertising are derived more from category expansion than 
are sales gains from price promotions.  Considerations of likely competitive response 
naturally affect the manager’s choice of the optimal marketing mix. 
To help the brand manager make informed marketing mix decisions, it is essential 
that marketing mix models appropriately measure the different effects of marketing 
instruments. The key argument of this paper is that extant discrete choice models are 
restrictive in this regard and can in fact misinform and misguide the manager. Classical 
models such as the logit, nested logit, and probit model make it appear that all marketing 
instruments are identical in terms of the source of share gains (Steenburgh 2008),   3
whereas our previous examples have illustrated that in fact differences between 
instruments could be substantial.  
Discrete choice models are commonly used to analyze how consumers respond to 
marketing actions in terms of whether or not to buy (purchase incidence) and which 
brand to buy (brand choice) (Bucklin, Gupta et al. 1998; Bell, Chiang et al. 1999). Thus, 
these models allow measurement of the proportion of increase in a brand’s choice share 
due to a given marketing action that is attributable to market expansion versus brand 
switching. Recent work, however, shows that a large class of existing discrete choice 
models, including ones that have been used to address this problem, possess the 
Invariant Proportion of Substitution (IPS) property, which implies that the proportion of 
demand generated by substitution away from a given competing alternative is the same, 
no matter which marketing instrument is employed (Steenburgh 2008). This is troubling 
because it implies that the proportion of growth due to new consumers purchasing in the 
category is the same no matter which marketing action is taken.  
Following Steenburgh (2008), we propose an alternative choice model specification 
that relaxes the IPS property – the Flexible Substitution Logit (FSL) model – and allows 
a wider variety of substitution patterns to be found in the data. We find that the FSL 
model provides a better fit to the data than extant models, and its conclusions vary 
substantially as well. Furthermore, we show that the FSL allows greater agreement 
between individual and population substitution patterns than extant models because it 
imposes neither IIA nor IPS on individual choice behavior.    4
We demonstrate our arguments empirically in the context of the marketing of 
prescription drugs, a context in which these issues are of central concern not only for 
brand managers but also for public policy makers. We show that patient-directed 
marketing instruments such as Direct to Consumer Advertising (DTCA) often work 
quite differently than physician-directed marketing actions such as detailing in terms of 
sources of demand gains. As a result, we might expect that models that possess the IPS 
property will provide an overly restricted representation of the effects of these activities. 
Indeed, our empirical application to prescription writing choices of physicians in the 
hyperlipidemia category shows this to be the case.  
We find that three commonly used models that all suffer from the IPS restriction -- 
the homogeneous logit model, the nested logit model, and the random coefficient logit 
model – lead to counter-intuitive estimates of the sources of demand gains due to 
increased marketing investments in DTCA, detailing, and professional Meetings and 
Events (M&E). The same is not true for the FSL. In particular, the FSL model provides 
the important insight that while most of the gains from detailing investments come at the 
expense of competing brands in the category (84%), most of the gains from DTCA and 
M&E are realized from patients who are not prescribed any drug treatment (87.4% and 
70.2% respectively). In other words, competitor brands should be much less threatened 
by DTCA and M&E actions than by detailing. This key distinction in how the marketing 
instruments work is disguised by extant models. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data. In 
Section 3 we present specifications of extant models as well as the FSL model. In Section   5
4 we discuss results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of 
results and implications for managerial actions and future research. 
2. Data 
We have chosen to examine differences in share stealing across marketing 
instruments in the context of pharmaceutical marketing. While there are multiple 
constituencies that determine demand for a brand drug, pharmaceutical firms in the US 
devote most of their marketing resources primarily to influence two groups -- physicians 
and patients. Pharmaceutical manufacturers spent at least $20.5 billion on promotional 
activities in 2008, excluding sampling. Of that, $12 billion went to detailing to physicians, 
$4.7 billion to DTCA, and $3.4 billion to M&E (CBO 2009). 
We expect to find different competitive impacts when firms invest in detailing, 
M&E and DTCA because these marketing instruments work in very different ways. 
Detailing is personal selling to physicians by pharmaceutical firms’ representatives. The 
representatives inform physicians about drug efficacy and safety, answer physicians’ 
questions, and establish and maintain goodwill of the brand. During the detailing visits, 
sales representatives also provide physicians with drug samples.  Firms have full control 
on what to communicate with physicians as long as messages conform to FDA 
regulations and these communications take place behind closed doors.  
In contrast, pharmaceutical firms also sponsor professional meetings and events, 
including some that offer physicians credit for continuing medical education. Firms may 
help fund, organize and advertise M&E, and may also subsidize attendance of physicians. 
Unlike detailing, firms can only influence the topics that are discussed in M&E indirectly   6
through M&E organizers like medical education communication companies or 
professional societies. As a consequence, the content of M&Es tends to be disease 
oriented, different from the brand-oriented communications in detailing.  In addition, 
discussion and interaction among attendees makes M&E attendance a different 
experience for physicians relative to detailing. 
Traditionally, a negligible part of the overall marketing budget was spent on 
influencing patients. However, in the last decade this component has been growing 
rapidly in the form of direct-to-consumer advertising. DTCA can expand the category via 
the informational and educational roles of advertising. Advertising can inform potential 
patients of the existence of a health condition, possible symptoms and consequences, as 
well as the availability of a treatment. Better-informed under-diagnosed or under-treated 
patients, in turn, will be able to understand their health conditions better, and may be 
prompted to seek medical consultation by visiting a physician. This perspective suggests 
that an important source of sales gains due to DTCA is newly diagnosed patients, who 
expand overall category demand and this potentially benefits all competing firms. 
Another role of DTCA is to persuade patients to ask their physicians for specific brand 
name drugs. The literature suggests that patient requests do influence physicians’ 
prescription behavior. As a consequence, sales gains occur due to physicians’ switching 
from competing brands, but also due to switching from “non-drug prescriptions.” The 
latter is a source that expands the category.   7
As discussed above, in the pharmaceutical industry, various marketing instruments 
are employed by firms and they are expected to influence demand, and hence 
competition, quite differently. 
The therapeutical class that we use in this study is statins (or HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors). Statins are drugs used to lower cholesterol levels in people at risk for 
cardiovascular disease because of hyperlipidemia. Statins are the most potent anti- 
hyperlipidemia agents and have dominated the anti- hyperlipidemia market. Statins sales 
surpassed $14.3 billion in 2009, making them one of the biggest selling drugs in the 
United States
1. During the period spanned by our data (2002–2004), there are four major 
statins available for prescription: Lipitor produced by Pfizer, Zocor by Merk, Pravachol 
by Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) and Crestor by AstraZeneca. “Non-drug only treatment” 
is also a common prescription issued by physicians if patients’ diagnosed condition is not 
severe enough for drug treatment. Non-drug treatment methods include: eating healthy, 
quitting smoking, increasing physical activity, moderating alcohol intake and maintaining 
an ideal body weight.   
Data on patient visits, prescriptions written by physicians, and detailing and M & E 
to which the physicians are exposed, are from a sample of 247 physicians in the U.S. over 
a 24-month period, from June 2002 to May 2004. The data were made available by a 
marketing research firm, ImpactRx Inc. The firm runs a panel consisting of a 
representative sample of the universe of physicians in the US, balanced across geographic 
regions, physician specialties and prescription volumes. Data on monthly DTCA 
                                                 
1 Source: IMS National Prescription Audit PLUS.   8
expenditures come from Kantar Media Intelligence. We link each patient visit to 
Designated Media Area (DMA) level DTCA expenditures through physician-level zip 
codes. DTCA is measured as $ expenditure per capita based on the population of the 
DMA. 
In Table 1 we present summary statistics of the data. Taking the unit of analysis to 
be physician-month for each of the four brands and for non-drug treatment, we show 
the number of prescriptions and market share of prescriptions, and levels of each of the 
marketing mix instruments. As shown in Table 1, on average, there are more detailing 
visits and M & E for Crestor than for the other three brands. However, DTCA 
expenditure on Lipitor is the largest among the four brands.  The prescription shares 
show that about one quarter of visits receives prescription for non-drug treatment 
instead of a drug treatment. Among the four drugs, Lipitor is the market leader, followed 
by Crestor, Zocor, and Pravachol.  
___________Table 1 about here_______________ 
The impacts of marketing variables considered in this study are expected to carry 
over from one period to the next with deteriorating effectiveness. To capture the long 
term effect, we follow the advertising model of (Nerlove and Arrow 1962) and introduce 
a vector of stock variables for marketing instruments: 
 
 
where         is the number of detailing visits by drug  j  to physician p in month t;  
      is the number of M&E sponsored by drug j that received participation by 
1 {, , } pjt pjt pjt pjt pjt x xD E T M E D T C     9
physician p in month t;        is drug j’s DTCA per capita $ expenditure in physician p’s 
DMA area in month t;  is the carry-over parameter with a value between 0 to 1.  
  For simplicity, we fixed the carry-over parameters of detailing and M&E at 0.86 
each, and that of DTCA at 0.75, based on previous research (Narayanan, Desiraju et al. 
2004). We use the first 14 months of data to calculate the value of initial stock of each 
marketing instrument. All models are fitted on the remaining 10 months of data. 
3. Model Specification 
In this section, we discuss the types of restrictions that two major discrete choice 
models -- the logit and the nested logit -- impose on individual substitution patterns. We 
then propose a model that allows for greater flexibility in substitution patterns. We also 
discuss the type of flexibility that taste heterogeneity adds to these models. 
3.1 Logit 
The most basic choice model is the homogeneous multinomial logit (McFadden 
1974). This model is constructed by decomposing the decision maker’s utility into 
observed and unobserved components, such that 
j jj uv    
The observed utility for alternative j , j v  is a function of observed attributes, j x , and the 
decision maker’s preferences,  . Typically, the observed utility of alternative good  j is 
specified as a linear function, such that  jj vx   and the observed utility of the outside 
good is defined to be zero ( 0 0 v  ). The unobserved utility,  j  , is assumed to follow an 
independent and identically distributed extreme value distribution.    10
Given these assumptions, the probability that the decision maker chooses alternative 



























As is well known, these choice probabilities mean that the homogeneous logit suffers 
from the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, an undesirable 
assumption about how decision makers substitute among alternatives. Specifically, IIA 
implies that demand must be drawn from competing alternatives in proportion to their 
market shares. For example, suppose the market share of Lipitor is 25%, Zocor is 15%, 
Pravachol is 10%, Crestor is 20% and the non-drug treatment is 30%. If an incremental 
marketing investment yields 100 additional units for Lipitor, then IIA implies that 20% 
of those units must come from Zocor, 13% from Pravachol, 27% Crestor, and 40% 
from the non-drug treatment.  
The homogeneous logit model also suffers from the Invariant Proportion of 
Substitution (IPS) property (Steenburgh 2008), another undesirable assumption about 
how decision makers substitute among alternatives. The proportion of incremental 
demand for alternative  j  drawn from alternative good k for a change in any attribute 
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Since the logit model has IPS, this ratio does not depend on which attribute is changed. 
In other words, regardless of whether the brand manager invests in detailing, M&E or   11
DTCA, the incremental demand for Lipitor must be drawn from the competing 
alternatives in the same proportion.  
The IPS property is especially troubling in our context because the point of the 
study is to determine whether specific marketing investments steal demand from 
competing drugs or from the non-drug treatment. We might expect detailing to draw a 
greater proportion of demand from competing goods than M&E and DTCA do. The 
logit would not let us find this out because it requires demand to be drawn from each 
competing alternative in proportion to its market share. Returning to the example, the 
model requires 60% of the incremental demand to be drawn from competing drugs and 
40% to be drawn from the non-drug treatment no matter which investment is made. 
3.2 Nested Logit 
Given that the logit model assumes overly restrictive substitution patterns, many 
new choice models have been proposed to allow greater flexibility. The nested logit (Ben-
Akiva 1973; McFadden 1978; Williams 1997), one of the more prominent models, has 
been used in previous decomposition studies (Bucklin, Gupta et al. 1998; Bell, Chiang et 
al. 1999). It is a step forward because it does not require demand to be drawn from 
competing alternatives in proportion to their market share.  
The nested logit is derived by creating a nesting structure on unobserved attributes. 
Let the choice set be grouped into N non-overlapping subsets denoted by 12 , , ,  N B BB 
. The utility that a decision maker derives from choosing alternative j in nest  n B  is 
specified as 
j jj uv      12













where 01 n    denotes the correlation among alternatives in nest  n B .  
Given these assumptions, the probability that the decision maker chooses alternative  
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| n j B P is the probability of choosing alternative j given nest  n B  is chosen; 
n B P  is the 
probability of choosing nest  n B ; and  n I  is the inclusive value of nest  n B . 
We want to allow more flexible substitution between the four drugs brands and the 
non-drug treatment. Following the work of Bucklin, Gupta et al. (1998) and Bell, Chiang, 
et al (1999), we divide the choice alternatives into two nests: one ( 0 B ) containing the 
non-drug treatment and the other ( 1 B ) containing the four drug brands. Given these 
assumptions, the probability that the physician prescribes non-drug treatment only is 
1 1
1
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As can be seen in the substitution ratio, the nested logit does address concerns due 
to IIA. Demand is not drawn from the alternatives in proportion to their market. 
Returning to the example, the proportion of demand drawn from the non-drug 
treatment could be 80% even thought its market share is 40%. 
  Nevertheless, the nested logit does not address concerns due to IPS. The model 
implies that the proportion of demand drawn from a given competing alternative is the 
same no matter which marketing investment is made. If the model predicts that 80% of 
the demand comes from the non-drug alternative following an investment in DTCA, 
then it will predict the same 80% following investments in M&E and detailing. Given the 
question that we are asking, we would like to develop a more flexible model. 
3.3 Flexible Substitution Logit (FSL) 
We have focused on the logit and nested logit models because they have been used 
in previous decomposition studies, but many other choice models possess the IPS 
property too. This class of models includes all generalized extreme value and the 
covariance probit models. Therefore, we have to develop a new choice model to address 
this problem.    14
Steenburgh (2008) suggests that it might be useful to relax the IPS property in the 
context of this problem by allowing the utility function of a given alternative to depend 
not only on its own attributes, but also on the attributes of competing alternatives. This 
means that investments in DTCA made by Lipitor should enter not only the utility 
function of Lipitor, but also the utility functions of Zocor, Pravachol, and Crestor. We 
propose a model based on this idea, called the flexible substitution logit (FSL). Unlike the 
logit or nested logit models, it allows the substitution patterns to vary across marketing 
instruments. 
The FSL model is derived as follows. The utility that a physician derives from 
prescribing alternative j is 
jjj uv    
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  and the observed utility of the outside good is defined to be zero. In effect, this 
specification creates a nesting structure on observed attributes. Marketing action  ja x  has 
two effects on the focal drug:  
(1) It increases preference for the focal drug over competing drugs in the category by 
a  . 
(2) It increases preference for the focal drug over the non-drug treatment by aa    .  
In addition to its effect on the focal drug, the marketing action increases preference for 
the competing drugs over the non-drug treatment by a  . The FSL is a form of the   15
universal logit (McFadden 1975; Koppelman and Sethi 2000) because it allows the 
attributes of competing alternatives to enter the utility function of the focal drug. If 
0   , then the FSL collapses to the logit model
2. 
If we assume that  j   are distributed extreme value, then the probability that the 


























Since the choice probabilities take a closed form, the FSL is easy to estimate with 
standard programs.
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(Proof is provided in the appendix.) Unlike either of the previous models, the FSL allows 
the proportion of demand drawn from both competing drugs and the non-drug 
alternative to vary across marketing instruments. (The flexibility is achieved because  a   
and  a   can vary across marketing instruments.) For example, 80% of the incremental 
demand could be created by market expansion if the brand manager were to invest in 
DTCA, but only 15% of the incremental demand could be created by market expansion 
                                                 
2 The universal logit has not been used much in practice. A notable exception is Krishnamurthi et al. 
(1995).    16
if the manager were to invest in detailing. It seems reasonable to allow for this possibility 
given our prior expectations of how the two marketing instruments work. 
3.4 Flexibility Provided by Taste Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneous choice models allow a wider variety of substitution patterns to occur 
among market shares than their homogeneous counterparts do. This does not mean, 
however, that allowing for taste variation solves the problems associated with IIA and 
IPS. Adding taste heterogeneity to a choice model does not change individual 
substitution patterns, and models such as the random coefficient logit and random 
coefficient nested logit preclude individual choice behavior that is reasonable 
(Steenburgh, 2008). In contrast, the FSL allows a wider variety of individual-level choice 
behavior to be recovered from the data.  
We create heterogeneous versions of all three models through random coefficients 
specifications. For example, the random coefficients FSL is specified as  
ij j i ij UX      
where 
 
Since the random coefficients FSL nests the random coefficients logit, we can 
empirically test whether adding flexibility at the individual-level of the model matters. 
Furthermore, we will use the estimates to compare the substitution patterns of all three 
models at both the individual and population levels, showing that the patterns of the FSL 
are logically consistent at both levels. 
   17
4. Results 
  To begin with we assumed parameter homogeneity across physicians and estimated 
a standard logit, a nested logit, and a FSL model. We then incorporated physician 
heterogeneity and estimated a random coefficient logit, a random coefficient nested logit, 
and a random coefficient FSL model on the data. 
4.1 Homogeneous Case 
  Parameter estimates and model fit statistics of the three homogeneous models are 
presented in Table 2. Both AIC and BIC indicate that the FSL model fits the data best, 
followed by the nested logit model and then the logit.   
______________Table 2 about here______________ 
  In Table 3, we present the own elasticities for Lipitor (as an illustration) and the 
substitution matrices. All the models find positive effects of detailing, DTCA, and M&E 
on physicians’ probability of prescribing the marketed drug. Notice that each model 
comes to roughly the same conclusion about the ability of marketing instruments to 
generate demand. The elasticity of demand is greatest from detailing (the own-elasticity is 
0.225 in the logit, 0.250 in the nested logit, and 0.269 in the FSL model). This is followed 
by the elasticity of demand from DTCA (0.122 in the logit, 0.102 in the nested logit, and 
0.095 in the FSL). The elasticity of demand is smallest from M&E (0.037 in the logit, 
0.037 in the nested logit, and 0.035 in the FSL). 
______________Table 3 about here______________ 
  Although the models come to roughly the same conclusion about the ability of the 
marketing instruments to generate demand, they predict very different substitution   18
patterns among the drugs. Let us begin by discussing the substitution patterns imposed 
by the logit model. Due to the IIA property, the logit model predicts that demand will be 
drawn from each of the alternatives in proportion to their market share. Thus, for every 
marketing instrument, the logit model implies that 67.1% of the incremental demand for 
Lipitor is drawn from competing drugs (20.7% from Zocor , 14.4% from Pravachol, and 
32.0% from Crestor) and 32.9% is drawn from the non-drug treatment. This approach to 
decomposition is consistent with the unit-based decomposition proposed by van Heerde, 
Gupta et al. (2003) and Steenburgh (2007). By comparison, the market shares in the raw 
data, excluding Lipitor, are 21.0% for Zocor, 14.7% for Pravachol, 31.9% for Crestor 
and 32.4% for the non-drug treatment.  
The logit model imposes overly restrictive substitution patterns on the data. First, 
there is no reason to believe that demand will be drawn from the competing alternatives 
in proportion to their market share. Second, there is no reason to believe that the 
substitution patterns will be the same across the marketing instruments. The nested logit 
model has been used in many previous decomposition studies because it allows for more 
realistic substitution patterns to be found in the data. Although it cures the first problem 
because it does not require demand to be drawn from competing goods in proportion to 
their market shares, it does not cure the second problem which is due to the IPS 
property. 
The nested logit model implies that the incremental demand for Lipitor will be 
disproportionately (relative the actual market shares) drawn from competing drugs. 
Regardless of the marketing instrument being used, 78.2% of the incremental demand   19
for Lipitor is drawn from competing drugs (24.2% from Zocor, 16.9% from Pravachol, 
and 37.1% from Crestor) and only 21.8% is drawn from the non-drug treatment. The 
nested logit model is more flexible than the logit because it allows for a wider variety of 
substitution patterns. Yet, it seems to be inadequate for the question that we are asking 
because of the IPS property. There is no reason to believe that the proportion of demand 
created by market expansion is the same for detailing, DCTA and M&E. 
  The FSL model allows a much richer set of substitution patterns to be recovered 
from the data because it is not subject to the IPS property. Most of the incremental 
demand created by detailing, 84.0%, is stolen from competing drugs (26.2% from Zocor, 
18.3% from Pravachol, and 39.5% from Crestor) and only 16.0% is drawn from the non-
drug treatment. These results suggest that salespeople may be selling the benefits of 
Lipitor against the benefits of competing drugs behind the closed doors of a doctor’s 
office.  
In stark contrast, the opposite occurs with the other marketing instruments. Most of 
the incremental demand created by DTCA, 87.4%, is drawn the non-drug treatment, 
with only 12.6% being drawn from the competing drugs (3.8% from Zocor, 2.7% from 
Pravachol, and 5.8% from Crestor). Similarly, most of the incremental demand created 
by M&E, 70.2%, is drawn the non-drug treatment, with only 29.8% being drawn from 
the competing drugs (9.3% from Zocor, 6.5% from Pravachol, and 14.0% from Crestor). 
These results suggest that DTCA and M&E have spillover effects not found in detailing.  
This seems to make sense because some pharmaceutical advertisements create 
awareness of a drug option and may also generate patient requests for medication.   20
Donohue, Berndt et al.(2004) studied how DTCA works for antidepressant drugs and 
observed that “for conditions like depression, which are associated with social stigma, 
advertising may reduce negative views associated with treatment” thereby making it 
easier for patients to request medication. Furthermore, meetings and events are disease 
oriented communications in nature and allow physicians to speak to one another, which 
may make the drug companies less willing to draw comparisons between the drugs. 
These results have important managerial implications too. Suppose a brand manager 
is trying to decide whether to invest their marketing dollars in detailing or DTCA. An 
investment in detailing will lead to a greater immediate increase in demand. The model 
implies that a 10% increase in the level of detailing will yield a 2.69% increase in demand, 
whereas a 10% increase in the level of DTCA will yield only a .95% increase in demand. 
Given these numbers, it seems like we would much rather invest in detailing than in 
DTCA. 
Nevertheless, 84.0% of the demand created by detailing is stolen from competing 
drugs, meaning that the demand for Lipitor increases by 2.26% by stealing demand away 
from other drugs and 0.43% comes at the expense of the non-drug option. By 
comparison, 87.4% of the demand created by DTCA comes from the non-drug option. 
This means that the demand for Lipitor increases by 0.12% by stealing demand away 
from other brands and .83% comes at the expense of the non-drug option. Thus, it 
would seem that competing drugs would have a greater incentive to retaliate if the Lipitor 
brand manager invests in detailing than if she invests in DTCA. Analogously, the   21
increase in demand that comes at the expense of non-drug treatment is greater if the 
manager invests in DTCA than if she invests in detailing. 
4.2 Heterogeneous Case 
  Although the FSL is the most flexible of the three homogeneous models we 
considered, we may wonder whether allowing for heterogeneity across physicians 
increases the flexibility of the logit and nested logit models and allows them to recover 
more realistic substitution patterns. To answer this empirical question we estimate 
heterogeneous versions of the three previously presented models – a random coefficient 
logit, a random coefficient nested logit, and a random coefficient FSL model. Estimation 
results are presented in Tables 4 – 6. In all models, we find evidence of significant 
heterogeneity across physicians in their responsiveness to marketing instruments. 
Furthermore, we find that the random coefficient FSL fits the data best, followed by the 
random coefficient logit, and then the random coefficient nested logit. 
_________Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here_________ 
  In Table 7, we present the own elasiticities for Lipitor (as an illustration) and the 
substitution matrices. All three models imply that detailing, DTCA, and M&E have 
positive effects on a physician’s probability of prescribing the marketed drug. Notice that 
all three models come to roughly the same conclusion about the ability of the marketing 
instruments to generate demand for Lipitor. The elasticity of demand is greatest for 
detailing (the own-elasticity is 0.329 in the random coefficient logit, 0.317 in the random 
coefficient nested logit, and 0.291 in the random coefficient FSL). The elasticities of   22
demand for DTCA and M&E are quite close in magnitude in each of the three models, 
and both are considerably smaller than the elasticity for detailing.  
    ________________Table 7 about here_______________ 
  Nevertheless, the models again come to very different conclusions about the 
substitution patterns among drugs. Unlike the homogeneous case, the random coefficient 
logit does allow for some variation in the substitution patterns across marketing 
instruments. The proportion of demand drawn from the non-drug treatment is 25.0% 
from detailing, 36.6% from DTCA, 36.4% from M&E. Similarly, the random coefficient 
nested logit implies that the proportion of demand drawn from the non-drug treatment 
is 15.2% from detailing, 27.0% from DTCA, and 27.0% from M&E. The direction of 
these results is consistent with what we found with the homogeneous FSL model. The 
proportion of demand that is stolen from competing drugs is greater for detailing than it 
is for DTCA and M&E. The magnitude of these differences, however, is much smaller, 
suggesting that the model is not as flexible as might be desired. 
  In contrast, the random coefficient FSL allows a richer set of substitution patterns 
to be recovered from the data. As we found in the homogeneous case, most of the 
incremental demand created by detailing, 79.0%, is stolen from competing drugs. Yet, the 
opposite occurs for the other marketing instruments. Most of the incremental demand 
created by DTCA and M&E is drawn from the non-drug treatment, 75.9% and 59.1% 
respectively. Allowing for heterogeneity provides only a limited degree of flexibility. 
Depending on the question being addressed, it may be more important to allow for 
flexibility across marketing instruments than across individuals.   23
We explore this issue further by examining the flexibility allowed and restrictions 
imposed by the models on individual physicians. In Tables 8a and 8b, we report the own 
elasticities and the substitution patterns for two systematically selected physicians in our 
data set. The random coefficient logit and random coefficient nested logit do provide 
more flexibility than their homogeneous counterparts because they allow the own 
elasticites to vary across physicians. For example, the random coefficient (nested) logit 
implies that the own elasticity from detailing is 0.204 (0.177) for physician A and 0.488 
(0.264) for physician B. Furthermore, these models allow the substitution patterns to 
vary across physicians. The random coefficient (nested) logit implies that 28.3% (21.2%) 
of the incremental likelihood of Physician A prescribing Lipitor is drawn from the non-
drug alternative whereas Physician B draws 38.1% (27.4%) from the non-drug treatment.   
_________Tables 8a and 8b about here_________ 
  Nevertheless, both the random coefficient logit and the random coefficient nested 
logit impose the IPS property on individual physicians’ choice behavior. This means that 
the substitution patterns for a given physician must be the same across marketing 
instruments. For example, regardless of the instrument being used, the random 
coefficient (nested) logit implies that 71.7% (78.8%) of the incremental demand for 
Lipitor attributable to physician A is drawn from competing drugs and 28.3% (21.2%) 
from the non-drug treatment. Yet, there is no reason to believe that the Physician A will 
behave the same way regardless of the marketing investment being made. The same 
pattern can be seen in Physician B’s choice behavior. Given that the focus of the study is 
to make statements about differences in the substitution patterns across marketing   24
instruments, it seems especially hard to justify requiring them to be the same at the 
individual level. 
  In contrast, the random coefficient FSL allows the substitution patterns to vary 
across marketing instruments at both the individual and aggregate levels. For example, 
the random coefficient FSL model implies that Physician A substitutes among the drugs 
in different ways depending on the marketing action being taken. Most of the 
incremental demand for Lipitor, 72.7%, is drawn from the competing drugs when 
detailing is used. Yet, most of the demand is drawn from the non-drug treatment when 
the other marketing instruments are used, 73.7% for DTCA and 71.0% for M&E. Unlike 
the other models, the random coefficient FSL can recover more realistic substitution 
patterns at both levels of the model. 
5. Discussion, Conclusions, and Future Research 
An essential decision facing any brand manager is the choice of marketing 
instruments to enhance the sales of the brand. Different instruments are relevant for 
different marketing objectives (category demand expansion or market share stealing). 
Discrete choice models that include the logit, the nested logit, and the probit have been 
used to analyze how consumers respond to marketing actions in terms of whether or not 
to buy (purchase incidence) and which brand to buy (brand choice). However, these 
models possess the IPS property.  The IPS property implies that the proportion of 
demand generated by substitution away from a given competing alternative is the same, 
no matter which marketing instrument is employed. Indeed our empirical application to 
prescription writing choices of physicians in the hyperlipidemia market shows this to be   25
the case.  We find that three commonly used models that all suffer from the IPS 
restriction – the homogeneous logit model, the nested logit model, and the random 
coefficient logit model – lead to counter-intuitive estimates of the sources of demand 
gains due to increased marketing investments in DTCA, detailing, and meetings and 
events.  
We then employ an alternative choice model specification that relaxes the IPS 
property – the flexible substitution logit (FSL) model. The FSL model, both 
homogeneous and random coefficient forms, predicts that increases in DTCA and M&E 
result in sales gains that come primarily from non-drug treatments rather than from other 
cholesterol lowering drugs. By contrast, the random coefficient logit model predicts for 
all three marketing instruments – DTCA, detailing, and M&E – that gains would come 
largely at the expense of competing drugs. This empirical result also suggests that the IPS 
property cannot be relaxed by adding physician heterogeneity.  
With the proposed FSL model, a brand manager of prescription drugs can develop a 
more nuanced and precise understanding of how different marketing instruments work, 
and plan the marketing mix accordingly. For example, the brand manager may place 
greater emphasis on category expanding instruments like DTCA or M&E if retaliation by 
competing brands is a significant concern. We believe there is considerable room for 
future research in this area. For instance, it would be important to identify other contexts 
in which the IPS property has important implications.  Similarly, alternative models that 
overcome IPS should also be explored.      26
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Unit of analysis is physician-month. N=5928 
Number of 
Prescriptions 
Brand  Mean  Std Dev Share of 
prescriptions 
 Lipitor  0.557  1.177  0.287 
 Zocor  0.291  0.620  0.150 
 Pravachol  0.203  0.704  0.105 
 Crestor  0.442  1.415  0.228 
 Non-drug 
Treatment 
0.448 1.076  0.231 
Marketing 
Instrument 
      
Detailing Lipitor  0.634  1.035     
(number of visits)  Zocor  0.728  1.128   
 Pravachol  0.366  0.746   
 Crestor  0.960  1.316   
DTCA Lipitor  0.040  0.016   
($ per capita)  Zocor  0.028  0.009   
 Pravachol  0.008  0.009   
 Crestor  0.023  0.039   
M&E Lipitor  0.031  0.202   
(number of 
meetings & events) 
Zocor 0.006  0.079   
 Pravachol  0.004  0.064   
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Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates and Fit Statistics of Three 
Homogeneous Models (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Variables  Logit  Nested Logit  Universal Logit 

















































Total-detailing-stock    
-0.018 
(0.003) 
Total-DTCA-stock    
2.328 
(0.917) 









Log likelihood  -7761  -7756  -7735 
AIC 15536  15528  15490 
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For each model, cell entries in each column indicate the percentage of sales increase of 
Lipitor due to a 1% increase in its marketing instrument (e.g. detailing) that is drawn 
from the alternative indicated in the row. For example, the logit model predicts that if 















  Logit Model  Nested Logit Model  FSL   
Detailing  DTCA M&E Detailing DTCA M&E Detailing DTCA M&E
Lipitor - -  - - -  - - -  - 
Zocor  20.7% 20.7%  20.7% 24.2% 24.2% 24.2% 26.2%  3.8%  9.3% 
Pravachol     14.4     14.4     14.4     16.8     16.8     16.8     18.3   2.7   6.5 




   32.9      32.9      32.9     21.8     21.8     21.8     16.0  87.4  70.2 
Total     100     100     100     100     100     100     100  100  100 
Own 
Elasticity 
0.225 0.122  0.037 0.250 0.102  0.037 0.269 0.095  0.035   29
Table 4: Parameter Estimates of Random coefficient Logit Model 
 






Intercept of Lipitor  -0.304  -0.486,  -0.135  0.087 0.007 
Intercept of Zocor  -1.297  -1.549,  -1.102   0.111 0.009 
Intercept of Pravachol  -1.842  -2.124, -1.543  0.149 0.012 
Intercept of Crestor  -1.010  -1.250, - 0.784  0.118 0.006 
Own - detailing - stock  0.129  0.105, 0.154  0.013 0.001 
Own - DTCA - stock  0.836  0.432, 1.162  0.219 0.026 
Own - M&E - stock  0.263  0.223, 0.315  0.027 0.003 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates of Random coefficient Nested Logit Model 
 






Intercept of Lipitor  0.152  0.005,  0.274  0.069  0.006 
Intercept of Zocor  -0.500  -0.693,  -0.332   0.093  0.009 
Intercept of Pravachol  -0.784  -1.058, -0.584  0.125  0.012 
Intercept of Crestor  -0.296  -0.541, - 0.080  0.121  0.011 
Own - detailing - stock  0.086  0.067, 0.106  0.010  0.001 
Own - DTCA - stock  1.960  1.684, 2.214  0.140  0.016 
Own - M&E - stock  0.239  0.132, 0.352  0.061  0.007 
Inclusive Value  0.669     0.628, 0.704  0.019  0.002 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates of Random coefficient FSL Model 
 






Intercept of Lipitor  -0.339  -0.499, -0.193  0.080  0.007 
Intercept of Zocor  -1.330  -1.619, -1.055  0.153  0.016 
Intercept of Pravachol  -1.672  -1.913, -1.430  0.125  0.009 
Intercept of Crestor  -1.023  -1.271, -0.769  0.130  0.009 
Own - detailing – stock  0.111  0.082, 0.151  0.019  0.002 
Own - DTCA – stock  1.414  1.171, 1.696  0.157  0.018 
Own - M&E - stock  0.308  0.272, 0.354  0.020  0.002 
Total-detailing-stock* - -  -  - 
Total-DTCA-stock 1.063  0.723,  1.534  0.226  0.027 
Total-M&E-stock 0.129  0.097,  0.166  0.019  0.002 
Log of Integrated Likelihood  -5886       
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Table 7: Substitution Matrices and Own Elasticities (for Lipitor) for Random coefficient 































Detailing DTCA  M&E  Detailing DTCA M&E  Detailing DTCA M&E
Lipitor  - -  - - -  - - -  - 
Zocor  29.5% 23.7%  23.7% 34.0% 27.2% 26.7% 30.0%  8.8% 14.8%
Pravachol    14.9  13.8  13.8    15.7  16.0   16.0     16.2    5.3    9.3 




  25.0  36.6  36.4    15.2  27.0   27.0     21.0  75.9  59.1 
Total    100  100  100    100  100   100     100  100  100 
Own 
Elasticity 
0.329 0.019  0.026 0.317 0.061  0.032 0.291 0.041  0.035   33
Table 8a: Substitution Matrices for Random coefficient Logit, Random coefficient 






Table 8b: Substitution Matrices for Random coefficient Logit, Random coefficient 












Detailing  DTCA M&E Detailing DTCA M&E Detailing DTCA M&E
Lipitor  - -  - - -  - - -  - 
Zocor  24.0% 24.0%  24.0% 29.5% 29.5% 29.5% 23.9%  8.7%  9.6% 
Pravachol    18.1   18.1   18.1    19.8   19.8   19.8    19.5     7.1    7.8 




  28.3   28.3   28.3    21.2   21.2   21.2    27.3   73.7  71.0 
Total    100   100   100    100   100   100    100   100  100 
Own 
Elasticity 













M&E Detailing DTCA M&E Detailing DTCA M&E
Lipitor  - -  - - -  - - -  - 
Zocor 23.7%  23.7%  23.7% 33.6%  33.6% 33.6% 31.0%  16.6%  23.1%
Pravachol     4.8    4.8    4.8    6.8    6.8    6.8    3.9    2.1    2.9 
Crestor   33.4   33.4   33.4   33.2   33.2   33.2   26.3   14.1    19.6  
Non-drug 
Treatment 
 38.1   38.1   38.1   27.4   27.4   27.4   38.8   67.1   54.4 
Total   100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100 
Own 
Elasticity 
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